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Abstract: Understanding the semantics of theoretical terms from past sci-
ence involves determining what, if anything, they referred to. Some ways
of assigning referents to such terms are Whiggish, in the sense that they
introduce anachronisms that distort the past, while others are not. My aim
in this paper is to develop a non-Whiggish semantic theory, one that avoids
Whiggish reference assignments. In order to do so, I make use of the example
of ‘phlogiston.’ I argue that it would be Whiggish to maintain that ‘phlogis-
ton’ sometimes referred to free electrons, but not Whiggish to maintain that
it sometimes referred to hydrogen. And I argue that we can avoid Whiggish
reference assignments by focusing on the operations that scientists perform.
On the theory I defend, theoretical terms refer by means of the operations
scientists use to identity their putative referents.
Keywords: Reference, Theoretical Terms, Whig History, Anachronism, Op-
erations, Phlogiston
1 Introduction
For some time, philosophers have been interested in the semantics of theo-
retical terms, and the challenges of referring to unobservable entities. Many
philosophers have taken an interest in this issue because of its implications for
the scientific realism debate. If our best theories are approximately true, as
scientific realists claim, then their theoretical terms must refer to unobserv-
able entities. A related, but distinct, reason to take an interest in this issue
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is that it has implications for our understanding of the history of science,
and this will be my focus in this paper.
One of our primary ways of learning about the history of science is by
reading old scientific texts. And these texts often contain a number of out-of-
date theoretical terms (e.g., ‘phlogiston,’ ‘caloric,’ and ‘luminiferous ether’).
It can be challenging to understand these texts, and semantics can play an
important role in helping us to understand them. For this reason, Thomas
Kuhn (1982a, p. 674) claims that “historians dealing with old scientific texts
can and must use modern language to identify referents of out-of-date terms.”
And Philip Kitcher (1993, p. 100) maintains that “using the ideas of modern
science to provide a picture of the relationships between [past scientists]
and the world” is not “Whiggish, illegitimate, [or] question begging,” on
the grounds that, “without some picture of the relationship between past
figures and the world, history is impossible: we cannot frame any hypotheses
about what their discourse means.” These philosophers, who have themselves
shaped the scientific realism debate in many important ways, thus recognize
a role for semantics outside of the debate—it can help us to understand past
science.
With this goal in mind, I’ll focus on retrospective reference assignments
to the theoretical terms of past science. In section 2, I’ll take some cues from
some recent and not-so-recent literature on the historiography of science, and
I’ll distinguish Whiggish reference assignments, which distort the past in var-
ious anachronistic ways, from non-Whiggish reference assignments, which do
not. I’ll use this distinction to draw another one, namely, between Whiggish
and non-Whiggish semantic theories. In section 3, I’ll consider a historical
example, and argue that it would be Whiggish to maintain that ‘phlogis-
ton’ sometimes referred to free electrons, but not Whiggish to maintain that
it sometimes referred to hydrogen. In section 4, I’ll argue that the theory
of reference that Stathis Psillos (1999) defends is an example of a Whig-
gish semantic theory. Contrary to what Psillos claims, his theory entails the
Whiggish result that ‘phlogiston’ referred to free electrons. Finally, in sec-
tion 5, I’ll propose my own non-Whiggish semantic theory, which makes use
of Hasok Chang’s (2009a; 2011) notion of operational meaning. According
to the theory I’ll defend, theoretical terms refer by means of the operations
scientists use to identity their putative referents.
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2 Whig History and Whiggish Semantics
My first goal is to explain what Whiggish semantics is. Since I’m borrowing
the term ‘Whiggish’ from the historiographical literature on Whig history,
I’ll start there. I’ll discuss what Whig history is, where it came from, and
why historians of science think it is so objectionable. After doing so, I’ll
show that some of the historiographical issues surrounding Whig history
are also semantic issues that concern retrospective reference assignments to
theoretical terms of past science. In that case, it also makes sense to talk
about whether reference assignments, and the semantic theories that yield
them, are Whiggish.
2.1 Whig History
The term ‘Whig history’ has its source in Herbert Butterfield’s The Whig
Interpretation of History . Butterfield characterizes Whig history as involv-
ing “[t]he study of the past with one eye, so to speak, upon the present,”
and he goes on to claim that it is “the source of all sins and sophistries in
history, starting with the simplest of them, the anachronism” (1965/1931,
pp. 31–32). Butterfield chose the term ‘Whig’ to characterize this particular
interpretation of history because the histories told from the perspective of
the English Whig party exemplify the kind of history he wanted to attack.
Whig historians, in the literal sense, viewed history as a progressive process
that culminated in the beliefs and ideals of the Whig party. And they dis-
tinguished between those historical actors who anticipated or contributed to
that progress, and those who hindered it. Butterfield generalizes from this
literal usage, and uses the term ‘Whig’ to refer to any kind of history that
views the past as a kind of inevitable, progressive march toward the present.
It took some time for Butterfield’s terminology to catch on among histo-
rians of science. But as Nick Jardine (2003, p. 127) observes, by the mid-
1970s, it became common for them to apply the terms ‘Whig’ and ‘Whig-
gish’ to works that depict past science in anachronistic ways. Butterfield
(1965/1931, p. 24) himself was concerned primarily with a kind of anachro-
nistic value judgment by which historians select what was important in the
past by appealing to what we consider important today. Obviously, there is
no guarantee that our value judgments will line up with those of the past
actors we study. And so, this kind of anachronism of selection may lead us
to emphasize the wrong aspects of some historical episode, and to thereby
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misrepresent it. As Jardine (2004, p. 261) notes, historians of science have
followed Butterfield, and they use the term ‘Whiggish’ to label this kind of
anachronism of selection.
But Jardine also points out that historians of science have used the same
term to label another kind of anachronism that is conspicuous by its ab-
sence from Butterfield’s discussion, namely, conceptual anachronism. Jar-
dine (2003, p. 127) characterizes this kind of anachronism as “the appli-
cation of our categories to the works and deeds of those who lacked such
categories.” And he identifies it with the kind of anachronism of which
Quentin Skinner (1969) was so critical (Jardine, 2004, p. 261). Skinner ar-
gued that such anachronism can lead historians to “understand the agent to
be doing something which he would not—or even could not—himself have
accepted as an account of what he was doing” (1969, p. 6; quoted in Jardine
2004, p. 261). Historians of science have condemned conceptual anachro-
nism, on the grounds that ‘understanding’ an agent in this way amounts to
misunderstanding that agent.1 As Jardine notes, historians of science have
generally sought to combat conceptual anachronism by replacing “Whiggish
and anachronistic narratives” with “historically sensitive” ones, i.e., ones
that adhere to “actors’ explicit categories” (2004, p. 268).
Jardine himself adopts a more measured view of anachronism.2 He main-
tains that history sometimes requires conceptual anachronism in order to
facilitate “communication of the resultant insights to living readers,” and
“to analyse and explain as well as describe past deeds and works” (2004,
p. 262). Moreover, he argues that historians can often depart from their
strict adherence to actors’ categories without committing vicious anachro-
nism, which he understands as “historically incoherent interpretation of past
deeds and works” (2000, p. 252). In order to distinguish cases in which the
retrospective application of a category results in vicious anachronism from
1To take one example, this is presumably what Adrian Wilson and T. G. Ashplant
(1988, p. 11) have in mind when they argue that “[t]he case of whig history demonstrates
that it is perfectly possible for a historian to work with inappropriate categories, with
anachronistic assumptions and expectations, in short with a present-centred mental ‘set’,
and so to produce history which distorts the past.”
2Jardine is not alone in this regard. Other recent examples include Nick Tosh (2003)
and Chang (2009b). Butterfield himself is a not-so-recent example, since, as Chang (2009b,
p. 255) notes, he turned to Whig history later in life. And even Kuhn (1977/1968, p. 110),
when suggesting that “the historian should set aside the science that he knows,” claimed
that historians should do so “[i]nsofar as possible,” and that “it is never entirely so, nor
could history be written if it were.”
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cases in which it does not, Jardine (2000) appeals to presuppositions. He
observes that there are presuppositions involved in the application of a cate-
gory. And he argues that if those presuppositions were not realized at some
time in the past, then it would be viciously anachronistic to apply that cate-
gory to actions taking place at that time. However, if the presuppositions are
realized, then although it may be anachronistic to apply a category that past
actors lacked, it is not viciously anachronistic. In fact, Jardine maintains
that departing from actors’ categories can even enhance our understanding
of the past in some cases.
Some examples should make the idea clear. To take one example, Jar-
dine claims to “have only the mildest reservations” about talk of Galileo’s
‘socio-professional identity’ (2000, p. 251). Even if those in Galileo’s time
lacked that category, the presuppositions for its application were arguably
realized, and so a retrospective application of that category does not result in
a vicious anachronism. In contrast, for Jardine, talk of Aristotle’s ‘biological
investigations’ is viciously anachronistic (2000, pp. 261–262). Since biology
did not exist as a discipline until some time in the nineteenth century, the
presuppositions required for the application of the category did not exist in
Aristotle’s time. Jardine is clear that the issue is not a linguistic one con-
cerning the use of terms like ‘biology’ and its cognates. Indeed, he maintains
that his view differs from others “in not requiring that disciplinary terms be
applied only to the activities of agents who themselves apply those terms to
their activities” (2000, p. 262).
My primary concern is not with the retrospective application of categories
to past works and deeds, but with a related kind of anachronism, to which
I’ll turn momentarily. Like Jardine, I take it that a complete prohibition
on anachronism would be unwise, and so I’ll attempt to distinguish between
vicious and non-vicious cases of that kind of anachronism. And given that the
kind of anachronism with which I am concerned bears some resemblance to
the kind with which Jardine is concerned, I’ll indicate the similarities between
Jardine’s way of distinguishing vicious from non-vicious anachronism and my
own.
2.2 Whiggish Semantics
The kind of anachronism with which I am concerned has to do with retro-
spective reference assignments to theoretical terms of the past, examples of
which include ‘phlogiston,’ ‘caloric,’ and ‘luminiferous ether.’ Understand-
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ing scientific discourse involving such terms requires us to assign referents
to those terms (where reference failure is a possible reference assignment).
And oftentimes it will conduce to our understanding to specify the referents
of those terms in modern language—after all, it won’t be particularly illu-
minating to be told that ‘phlogiston’ refers, if at all, to phlogiston. This use
of modern language obviously opens the door to anachronism, and just as in
the cases discussed above, such anachronistic reference assignments can be
vicious or non-vicious. My goal at this point is to distinguish reference as-
signments that are viciously anachronistic from those that are not, and to use
this distinction in order to distinguish between Whiggish and non-Whiggish
semantic theories.
It will be helpful to discuss an example first. Kitcher (1993, p. 100) has ar-
gued for a particular retrospective reference assignment, namely, that Joseph
Priestley’s ‘dephlogisticated air’ referred, at least on some occasions, to oxy-
gen. However, Christina McLeish (2005, p. 680) objects to this reference
assignment, on the grounds that “providing a semantics for statements made
in the past is not the same as writing a history of that past, even though the
history is very important to the semantics.” History, according to McLeish,
aims to tell us what happened. Providing a semantics for statements made in
the past involves determining whether past actors correctly described what
happened, or referred to it at all. She admits that our present-day conceptual
schemes can play a valid role in determining what happened in the past. In
that case, we can say truly that Priestley isolated relatively pure samples of
oxygen gas. When it comes to semantics, McLeish holds that the question of
whether past actors referred to what happened is a question, not just about
what happened, but about the representational states of those past actors.
She makes the further point that it would be a mistake to let our present-
day conceptual schemes stand in for the representational states of those past
actors. In that case, the fact that Priestley isolated relatively pure samples
of oxygen gas is not sufficient to establish that he referred to oxygen when he
used the term ‘dephlogisticated air.’ And while our present-day conceptual
schemes might be sufficient for us to refer to oxygen, if they were unavailable
to Priestley, then Kitcher must find some other way to make it plausible
that Priestley’s ‘dephlogisticated air’ referred to oxygen. McLeish goes on to
conclude that this particular reference assignment is implausible.
In section 5, I’ll argue that it’s not viciously anachronistic to hold that
Priestley’s ‘dephlogisticated air’ referred, at least on some occasions, to oxy-
gen. That said, even if I think McLeish is wrong about this particular ref-
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erence assignment, her objection to Kitcher’s view gives us the resources for
distinguishing reference assignments that are viciously anachronistic from
those that are not. In particular, she makes two points that I will employ in
order to draw this distinction.
First of all, there is McLeish’s point that reference is not simply a matter
of what happened in a speaker’s immediate environment, but depends on the
representational states of the speaker. The insight here is that it takes some
work for scientists to fix the reference of theoretical terms to theoretical
entities, especially to unobservable ones. It is, of course, well known that
ostension is often sufficient to fix the reference of a term in ordinary contexts.
But in scientific contexts, it’s often more difficult to fix reference. John
Worrall (2007, p. 148) brings out the difficulty with the following example:
Think about how one might ‘ostend’ the electromagnetic field,
say, in order to ‘baptise’ it: clearly we could only know that we
are ostending the field (in fact you can point in any direction you
like!) via the theory of the field.
I take Worrall’s point that something more than ostension is required to fix
the reference of many theoretical terms. But it’s important to recognize that,
in addition to theory, experiment can also play a role in fixing reference, as
I’ll argue in section 5. For now, the point I want to make is that, even
if fixing reference in ordinary contexts doesn’t require much sophistication,
fixing the reference of theoretical terms requires scientists to have some rather
sophisticated beliefs and/or abilities. Their representational states therefore
depend, at least in part, on various theoretical beliefs and/or experimental
capabilities.
Secondly, there is McLeish’s point that it would be a mistake to substitute
the representational states of past speakers with our present-day conceptual
schemes, at least if we have good reason to think that past speakers lacked
those conceptual schemes. While I take it that McLeish is correct, the point
that she makes applies to more than just conceptual schemes. More generally,
it would be a mistake to attribute our theoretical beliefs and experimental
capabilities to past scientists who lacked them.
At this point, we have what we need to distinguish reference assignments
that are viciously anachronistic from those that are not. Consider a scien-
tist S who uses some theoretical term t. In order for S to use t to refer to
some theoretical entity x, S needs to have some rather sophisticated beliefs
and/or abilities. Now let’s suppose that we conclude that S used t to refer
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to x. If drawing this conclusion requires attributing to S beliefs and/or abil-
ities that S actually lacked, then the assignment of x as the referent of t is a
viciously anachronistic reference assignment . In what follows, I’ll also refer
to such a reference assignment as a Whiggish reference assignment . Other-
wise, we have a non-Whiggish reference assignment , and these come in two
varieties. If we specify the referent of t in modern language that was unavail-
able to S (say, by using our present-day theoretical terms), then we have an
anachronistic-but-non-vicious reference assignment . And if we specify the
referent using language available to S, then we have a non-anachronistic ref-
erence assignment . Finally, a Whiggish semantic theory is one that entails
at least one Whiggish reference assignment, while a non-Whiggish semantic
theory entails none.
My way of distinguishing reference assignments that are viciously anachro-
nistic from those that are not owes something to Jardine’s way of distinguish-
ing between vicious and non-vicious anachronism in the application of cate-
gories to the works and deeds of past actors who lacked those categories. I’m
in agreement with Jardine that characterizing the past in terms of modern
language unavailable to past actors is not always viciously anachronistic, and
can often enhance our understanding of the past. And I take it that my use
of beliefs and abilities of past scientists plays much the same role as Jardine’s
use of presuppositions. While it may be possible to subsume my distinction
under his, it would, at the very least, take some work, since Jardine does
not address the reference of theoretical terms. In any case, the important
point, for my purposes, is not that my distinction ultimately differs from
Jardine’s, but that we have a way of distinguishing reference assignments
that are viciously anachronistic from those that are not.
Before moving on, it will be helpful to make some clarifications. First of
all, it’s worth emphasizing that I’m treating reference failure as a possible
reference assignment. While it’s difficult to conceive of how reference failure
would ever be Whiggish, it may be the case that, for some theoretical terms
of the past, the only non-Whiggish reference assignment is reference failure.
Secondly, our candidates for referents of theoretical terms, both past and
present, are entities that we presently take to exist. But that doesn’t mean
that all retrospective reference assignments (or at least the non-empty ones)
are anachronistic. After all, it’s possible that some past scientists shared at
least some of our present-day terms, beliefs, and abilities, in light of which
they succeeded in referring to entities that we presently take to exist.
Thirdly, it’s worth noting that there may be a point to Whiggish refer-
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ence assignments. For example, even if it were Whiggish to maintain that
Priestley’s ‘dephlogisticated air’ referred to oxygen, it may be useful to put
forward this reference assignment for pedagogical purposes. It may be a
good first approximation or useful fiction that students can dispense with
later in the semester, in favor of a more sophisticated view. However, even
if they’re useful for some purposes, Whiggish reference assignments are still
historiographical mistakes.
Fourthly, and finally, determining whether a particular reference assign-
ment is Whiggish is a non-trivial task. It will involve investigating the lan-
guage, beliefs, and abilities of past scientists. It will also involve determining
what combination of language, beliefs, and abilities is required for fixing ref-
erence to a particular theoretical entity. As such, it will often be a matter
of some debate whether a particular reference assignment is Whiggish. That
said, I take it that these are among the issues that historians and philosophers
of science ought to debate.
3 How to be Whiggish About Phlogiston
My goal, in the remainder of the paper, is to develop a non-Whiggish seman-
tic theory, i.e., one that yields only non-Whiggish reference assignments. In
order to meet this goal, I’ll make use of one example of a Whiggish reference
assignment, and one example of a non-Whiggish reference assignment, which
I introduce in this section. Both are reference assignments to the term ‘phlo-
giston.’ To a first approximation, phlogiston was a substance that chemists
working in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries posited as a component
of metals and combustible substances. Metals were thought to lose phlogis-
ton when they transformed into what chemists at the time called ‘calxes,’
which we now know as oxides; and combustible substances were thought to
lose phlogiston in the process of combustion. I’ll now argue that it’s not
Whiggish to maintain that ‘phlogiston’ sometimes referred to hydrogen, but
that it is Whiggish to maintain that it sometimes referred to free electrons.
3.1 ‘Phlogiston’ and Hydrogen
The first reference assignment I’ll consider is that ‘phlogiston’ sometimes re-
ferred to hydrogen. A number of philosophers have considered this proposal,
which is one subject of an exchange between Philip Kitcher, Mary Hesse, and
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Thomas Kuhn. Kitcher (1982, p. 691) claims that “ ‘[p]hlogiston’ sometimes
refers to hydrogen.”3 Hesse (1982, p. 707) responds as follows:
We have not only to say that phlogiston sometimes referred to
hydrogen and sometimes to absorption of oxygen, but we have to
convey the whole ontology of phlogiston in order to make plausi-
ble why it was taken to be a single natural kind.
Kuhn (1982b, p. 712) agrees with Hesse, and provides the following response:
The processes to which she refers are independent, and the older
literature of the history of science provides countless examples
of the ease with which one may complete the first [i.e., assign-
ing referents to ‘phlogiston’] without taking even a step toward
the second [i.e., explaining why phlogiston was taken to be a sin-
gle natural kind]. The result is an essential ingredient of Whig
history.
In what follows, I’ll ignore the points about the absorption of oxygen, and
about the second process, and I’ll simply consider whether the proposal that
‘phlogiston’ sometimes referred to hydrogen is a Whiggish reference assign-
ment in the sense I proposed in section 2.2.
In order to do so, I’ll first have to discuss the reasons for taking this
proposal seriously. In short, it’s a reasonable proposal to consider because
a number of phlogiston theorists identified phlogiston with inflammable air,
which we now call hydrogen. Richard Kirwan is arguably the chemist who
did the most to defend this identification, and he argues for it in the following
way. He begins by listing a number of phlogiston’s properties:
By phlogiston is generally understood that principle in combustible
bodies on which their inflammability principally depends; that
principle to which metals owe their malleability and splendor;
that which combined with vitriolic acid [i.e., sulfuric acid] forms
sulphur; that which diminishes respirable air. (1782, p. 197)
3The subject of the exchange here is really Kitcher’s earlier assertion that a number
of phlogiston theorists “believed that the inflammable air which they had isolated was
phlogiston,” and “went on to record the properties of inflammable air (hydrogen) using
the term ‘phlogiston’ ” (1978, p. 534). I’ll discuss some of these phlogiston theorists in
detail below.
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In the pages that follow this passage, Kirwan goes on to argue that these
properties are all properties of inflammable air. He concludes that “in-
flammable air . . . is one and the same substance with phlogiston” (1782, p.
209). Some years later, in his Essay on Phlogiston and the Constitution of
Acids , Kirwan is clear that this identification is not an idiosyncrasy of his
phlogiston theory, but that it has “met the approbation of the most distin-
guished philosophers, both at home and abroad” (1789, p. 5). He goes on to
list a number of phlogiston theorists who, he claims, also accept this iden-
tification, including “Dr. Priestley, Mr. Bewly, Mr. Bergman, Mr. Morveau,
De La Metherie, Chaptal, Crell, Wiegleb, Westrumb, Hermstadt, Kaersten,
&c.” (1789, p. 5). To be sure, not all phlogiston theorists maintained this
identification; and among those who did, some subsequently abandoned it.
That said, the fact that many prominent phlogiston theorists maintained the
identification is surely enough to motivate us to take seriously the proposal
that ‘phlogiston’ sometimes referred to hydrogen.
Now that I’ve discussed the reasons in favor of this proposal, we can ask
whether it’s Whiggish. My basic idea is that, because Kirwan and others
identified phlogiston with inflammable air, which just is hydrogen, this refer-
ence assignment is not Whiggish. That said, there are two reasons why one
might suspect that it really is Whiggish. First of all, I haven’t shown that
it’s not Whiggish to maintain that ‘inflammable air’ referred to hydrogen.
Secondly, it may be the case that, even though some chemists at the time
identified phlogiston with inflammable air, and others identified inflammable
air with hydrogen, none identified phlogiston with hydrogen. With regard
to the first concern, I’ll have more to say about why it’s not Whiggish to
maintain that ‘inflammable air’ referred to hydrogen later in this section,
and also in section 5. But this reference assignment would be a side issue
if, in response to the second concern, one could show that there were some
chemists at the time who used ‘hydrogen’ (or one of its cognates) to specify
the referent of ‘phlogiston.’
I’ll now discuss two such cases. The first is implicit, and is found in
Antoine Lavoisier’s response to the following passage from Kirwan’s Essay :
it seems to me very difficult to conceive how pure air can unite
to phlogiston . . . without forming a new compound . . . ; it seems,
therefore, more reasonable to conclude, either that it forms water,
as Mr. Cavendish thinks, or fixed air, as I shall endeavour to prove
in the following sections. (1789, p. 39)
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In the commentary that he provided for the second edition of Kirwan’s Essay ,
Lavoisier writes: “[Kirwan] thinks that, from this combination of oxigene
[sic] and hydrogene [sic], there does not always result water; that in some
circumstances the result is fixed air, or carbonic acid” (in Kirwan, 1789, p.
56). Lavoisier could not have characterized Kirwan’s view in this way unless
he identified Kirwan’s pure air with his own oxigene, and Kirwan’s phlogiston
with his own hydrogene. The second case is more explicit, and occurs about
twenty years later. In the course of speculating on the nature of metals,
Humphry Davy writes of “the adherence of their phlogiston or hydrogene
[sic]” (1808, p. 364), thus explicitly identifying the two. Hence, at least some
chemists at the time identified phlogiston and hydrogen, in which case it’s
not Whiggish to maintain that ‘phlogiston’ sometimes referred to hydrogen.
At this point, one might question whether it’s Whiggish to assign hy-
drogen as the referent of Lavoisier’s and/or Davy’s ‘hydrogene.’ After all
there’s a strong sense in which Lavoisier’s hydrogene is different from our hy-
drogen, since Lavoisier’s hydrogene gas was a compound of hydrogene base
and caloric (Lavoisier, 1965/1789, p. 198). But, to echo a point that Kuhn
(1996/1962, p. 55) makes about oxygen, it’s surely too much to conclude that
chemists could not refer to hydrogen until sometime after the 1860’s, when
the caloric theory of heat was finally abandoned. To anticipate a point that
I’ll make in section 5, this is because chemists working in the late eighteenth
century were already able to isolate relatively pure samples of hydrogen gas.
Moreover, they were able to determine enough of the properties of those
samples in order to conclude that they were dealing with a substance that
differed from other gases with which they were familiar.
In that case it’s not anachronistic, and therefore not Whiggish, to main-
tain that ‘phlogiston’ (along with ‘hydrogene’ and ‘inflammable air’) some-
times referred to hydrogen. At worst, this reference assignment involves an
anachronistic application of modern language (‘hydrogen’) to specify the ref-
erent of ‘phlogiston,’ but does not involve attributing beliefs and abilities to
past chemists who lacked those beliefs and abilities. And at best, this refer-
ence is not even anachronistic, since past chemists did specify the referent of
‘phlogiston’ by using a cognate of ‘hydrogen’ that is still used today, namely,
the French term ‘hydroge`ne.’
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3.2 ‘Phlogiston’ and Free Electrons
The second reference assignment that I’ll consider is inspired by Hasok Chang’s
work on the Chemical Revolution. While Kuhn’s remarks suggest that Whig
history is rather easy to fall into, Chang (2009b; 2012, ch. 1) argues that it’s a
more difficult attainment, and that historians have not been properly Whig-
gish about phlogiston. He attempts to show what a truly Whiggish view of
phlogiston would look like, not as an idle exercise in Whiggishness, but in
order to highlight the unexplored potential of the phlogiston theory. One of
the conclusions that he draws is that, “[i]f we were to be truly whiggish, we
would recognize phlogiston as the precursor of free electrons” (2012, p. 44).
The second proposal that I’ll consider, then, is that ‘phlogiston’ sometimes
referred to free electrons.
I’ll motivate this proposal by appealing to the two ways in which Chang
supports the identification of phlogiston with free electrons. First of all,
Chang compares phlogistonist explanations of various phenomena with those
explanations that we currently accept. Regarding the common properties of
metals, Chang (2012, pp. 43–44) writes:
Phlogistonists explained the common properties of metals by say-
ing that all metals were rich in phlogiston; . . . the phlogistonist
account actually has a close resonance with the modern notion
that all metals share metallic properties because they all have a
“sea” of free electrons.
Regarding the processes of reduction and oxidation, which phlogiston theo-
rists understood as phlogistication and dephlogistication, respectively, Chang
(2012, p. 44) quotes the following passage from the chemist Gilbert Newton
Lewis (1926, pp. 167–168):
If they [the phlogistonists] had only thought to say “The sub-
stance burning gives up its phlogiston to, and then combines with,
the oxygen of the air,” the phlogiston theory would never have
fallen into disrepute. Indeed, it is curious now to note that not
only their new classification but even their mechanism was essen-
tially correct. It is only in the last few years that we have realized
that every process that we call reduction or oxidation is the gain
or loss of an almost imponderable substance, which we do not
call phlogiston but electrons.
13
And regarding “the production of flame in combustion,” Chang (2012, p. 45)
notes that “flame is a plasma, which is mostly a mixture of positive ions and
electrons.” He argues that the identification of phlogiston with electrons “fits
in nicely here, if we take the release of flame as a result of the dissociation of
phlogiston (electrons) from the combustible substance” (2012, p. 45) Hence,
when it comes to these phenomena, the phlogistonist explanations are similar
to the explanations that we currently accept.
The second way in which Chang supports his identification of phlogiston
with free electrons involves showing that a number of phlogiston theorists
posited a close connection between phlogiston and electricity. Among their
reasons for doing so was that they could transform calxes into metals by
means of electricity, and they understood such transformations in terms of
gain in phlogiston (2012, p. 44). Chang mentions that there were at least
23 theorists who posited such a connection. I’ll briefly note three examples.
First of all, Chang (2012, p. 44) mentions John Elliott (1780, p. 92), who
proposed to replace the term ‘phlogiston’ with ‘electron’ because of the close
connection between phlogiston and electricity. Secondly, Chang (2012, pp.
80–82) discusses Joseph Priestley (1802, p. 202), who, after recounting some
experimental results, claims that they “favour the hypothesis of two electric
fluids , the positive containing the principle of oxigen [sic], and the negative
that of phlogiston.” And thirdly, Chang (2012, p. 80) notes that George
Smith Gibbes (1809, p. 13) posits a similar connection when he claims that
“[t]he principle of the negative side of the galvanic apparatus resides in all
combustible bodies, . . . and answers exactly to the Phlogiston of Scheele.”
For these reasons, Chang (2012, p. 44) concludes that the connection between
phlogiston and electricity is not just a “retrospective fabrication.”
Of course, even if it is not, Chang is correct about the Whiggishness of
identifying phlogiston with free electrons. And although Chang does not put
the point in terms of reference, it’s also the case that it is truly Whiggish to
maintain that ‘phlogiston’ sometimes referred to free electrons. To be sure,
we can admit that chemists, at the time, could use the term ‘phlogiston’ to
refer to electricity, which we now understand in terms of electrons. But to
say that these chemists could thereby refer to free electrons is to attribute to
them a theoretical sophistication that they surely lacked, and that wasn’t at-
tained until the late nineteenth century at the earliest. J. J. Thomson’s work
on cathode rays, along with H. A. Lorentz and Pieter Zeeman’s work on the
Zeeman effect, arguably constitute the earliest moments at which reference
to electrons was fixed. Their experimental capabilities and theoretical ex-
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planations were simply unavailable to phlogiston theorists working a century
earlier. Insofar as reference to electrons requires something approximating
the beliefs and abilities of physicists working in the late nineteenth century,
it would be viciously anachronistic to maintain that chemists working in the
late eighteenth century could refer to electrons. Hence, this second proposal
amounts to a Whiggish reference assignment.
4 An Example of Whiggish Semantics
I’ll now consider one semantic theory for assigning referents to theoretical
terms, which is due to Stathis Psillos (1999, ch. 12). I’ll show that, contrary
to what Psillos himself argues, his theory can be used to support the claim
that ‘phlogiston’ sometimes referred to free electrons. In that case, it yields
a Whiggish reference assignment, and is an example of a Whiggish semantic
theory.
Psillos aims to develop a causal-descriptivist theory of reference that cap-
tures the strengths, but not the weaknesses, of purely causal theories and
purely descriptive theories, respectively. He begins with the familiar ob-
servation that descriptive theories make reference too difficult (1999, pp.
281–282). Such theories require that the referent of a theoretical term is
that entity which satisfies all or most of the descriptions associated with
that term. As is well known, Saul Kripke (1980) and Hilary Putnam (1975)
showed how reference can succeed in the absence of such a description. This
was taken to be a desirable result, since the descriptions that scientists as-
sociate with various theoretical terms are often flawed. To take a couple of
examples: Lavoisier’s oxygen was supposed to be the principle of acidity, and
John Dalton’s atoms were supposed to be surrounded by spheres of caloric.
If we want to say that they nonetheless succeeded in referring, then reference
to theoretical entities can’t merely be a matter of satisfying a description.
In response, a number of philosophers developed various causal theories
of reference, and Psillos goes on to make another familiar observation about
such theories, namely, that they make reference too easy (1999, p. 290). To
a first approximation, these theories maintain that reference to a theoretical
entity is fixed by first specifying some phenomena, and then introducing a
theoretical term as a name for the entity that is the underlying cause of those
phenomena. But so long as those phenomena have some cause or other, the
theoretical term cannot fail to refer—it will refer to the cause, whatever it
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happens to be. If we want to say that terms like ‘caloric’ and ‘luminiferous
ether’ failed to refer, then reference can’t merely be a matter of specifying
the cause of some phenomena.
While I’m generally in agreement with Psillos’s assessment of the respec-
tive weaknesses of descriptive and causal theories, I aim to argue that his
own causal-descriptivist semantic theory is Whiggish. I’ll now turn to that
theory, which Psillos (1999, pp. 295–296) characterizes in the following way:
a theoretical term t typically refers by means of a core causal
description of a set of kind-constitutive properties, by virtue of
which its referent x is supposed to play a given causal role in
respect of a certain set of phenomena. Given this, the following
conditions are easy to motivate.
1 A term t refers to an entity x if and only if x satisfies the
core causal description associated with t.
2 Two terms t′ and t denote the same entity if and only if
(a) their putative referents play the same causal role with
respect to a network of phenomena; and (b) the core causal
description of t′ takes up the kind-constitutive properties of
the core causal description associated with t.
Psillos understands kind-constitutive properties as “those whose presence in
an item makes that item belong to a kind,” and as “those whose presence
makes a set of objects have the same, or sufficiently similar, manifest proper-
ties, causal behaviour and causal powers” (1999, p. 288). These are the same
properties that allow the kind to fulfill its causal role in the production of
a given set of phenomena (1999, pp. 297–298). Psillos also claims that, “[i]f
the kind-constitutive properties attributed to the referent are not the causal
origin of the information associated with the term employed to refer to it,
then the term fails to refer” (1999, p. 291). The information associated with
the term is the core causal description mentioned above. And in order for
the kind-constitutive properties to be the causal origin of this information,
it must be the case that those properties are, in fact, causally responsible for
producing the phenomena in question.
Psillos relies on two examples of theoretical terms in order to illustrate his
theory: ‘luminiferous ether,’ and, to a lesser extent, ‘phlogiston.’ Regarding
the former, he argues that his theory yields the result that ‘luminiferous
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ether’ referred to the electromagnetic field (1999, p. 296). It’s worth noting
that this could be a Whiggish reference assignment, though I won’t argue for
this claim here. Instead, I’ll focus on his other example, namely, ‘phlogiston,’
and I’ll argue that Psillos’s theory yields the Whiggish result that it referred,
at least sometimes, to free electrons.
Psillos himself argues that his theory yields the result that ‘phlogiston’
fails to refer. His goal in doing so is to show that his theory amounts to an
improvement over a purely causal theory of reference, which yields the coun-
terintuitive result that ‘phlogiston’ refers to oxygen. It does so, according to
Psillos, because “ ‘[p]hlogiston’ was introduced on many occasions by means
of a causal description, i.e. one that singled out phlogiston as the physical
magnitude causally involved (given off) in combustion” (1999, pp. 290–291).
Psillos goes on to explain why such a theory yields this counterintuitive re-
sult:
If we follow the letter of the causal theory and accept that ‘phlo-
giston’ was coined to refer purely existentially to whatever is
causally involved in combustion, then the conclusion is inescapable—
‘phlogiston’ refers to oxygen, since the latter is what is causally
involved in combustion. (1999, p. 291)
In contrast, Psillos maintains that “[w]hat it is correct to say is that ‘phlogis-
ton’ refers to nothing” (1999, p. 291). When it comes to his own theory, he
claims that he “can explain why ‘phlogiston’ does not refer,” on the grounds
that, “if the core description fails, then the putative entity does not exist”
(1999, p. 298). Psillos holds that the core causal description associated with
‘phlogiston’ will at least include a description of “the property that it is
released during the process of combustion” (1999, p. 298). His all-things-
considered view regarding ‘phlogiston’ is that this core causal description
fails to pick out anything, and so ‘phlogiston’ fails to refer.
While Psillos may succeed in showing that, on his theory of reference,
‘phlogiston’ fails to refer to oxygen, he doesn’t succeed in showing that it
fails to refer altogether. As we saw in section 3.2, there is something released
during the process of combustion, namely, free electrons. In that case, there
is something that has the kind-constitutive property that, according to Psil-
los, the core causal description associated with ‘phlogiston’ must describe.
To be sure, the core causal description will describe other kind-constitutive
properties of phlogiston, e.g., that it is a component of metals, and that it is
released in the process of dephlogistication, i.e., oxidation. But as we saw in
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section 3.2, these are also properties of free electrons. In that case, the core
causal description of phlogiston’s kind-constitutive properties is satisfied by
free electrons. Moreover, this also shows that, when it comes to phenomena
like combustion and oxidation, phlogiston and free electrons play the same
causal role. And so, on Psillos’s theory, ‘phlogiston’ actually refers to free
electrons. In that case, it’s an example of a Whiggish semantic theory.
5 Towards a Non-Whiggish Semantics
In this final section, I’ll develop and defend a non-Whiggish semantic theory.
My goal in this section is to make it plausible that we can avoid Whiggish
reference assignments if we pay attention, not just to what scientific theo-
ries say, but also to what scientists do. In other words, we ought to pay
more attention to scientific practices, and in particular, to the experimental
operations that scientists perform. In order to develop my non-Whiggish
alternative to Psillos’s theory of reference, I’ll make use of Chang’s (2009a;
2011) notion of operational meaning, which I’ll discuss momentarily. And
after putting forward my alternative, I’ll show that my approach yields the
non-Whiggish result that ‘phlogiston’ sometimes referred to hydrogen, and
avoids the Whiggish result that it sometimes referred to free electrons.
To begin with, I’ll discuss Chang’s notion of operational meaning, which
he illustrates in terms of the example of Lavoisier’s ‘oxygen’ (2011, pp. 415–
420). For Lavoisier, oxygen gas is a compound of oxygen base and caloric, and
oxygen base is his principle of acidity, i.e., that which makes acidic substances
acidic. Both of these claims played a central role in Lavoisier’s oxygen theory,
and both were abandoned by chemists sometime in the nineteenth century.
Nonetheless, chemists retained oxygen, and Chang is concerned with the
question of why they were justified in doing so. His answer is that, while the
theoretical meaning of ‘oxygen’ changed over time, there was continuity at
the operational level. He explains the basic idea as follows:
All of the procedures that Lavoisier had used for producing and
identifying oxygen gas are still repeatable and valid; . . . Heat some
red oxide of mercury intensely; collect the evolving gas in a glass
jar; see things burn with special vigor in that gas, and animals
live longer; breathe it and feel a lightness in the lungs; explode
it together with hydrogen gas and make water. This operational
18
stability is what is responsible for fixing the extension or refer-
ence of “oxygen”, to the extent that it has been fixed over the
centuries. (2011, p. 419)
Chang goes on to use this idea in order to show how distinct theoretical
terms from distinct theories can share an operational meaning. He claims
that “it is a straightforward matter to observe that the operational meaning
of Lavoisier’s ‘oxygen’ was pretty much the same as that of Joseph Priestley’s
‘dephlogisticated air’, or Carl Wilhelm Scheele’s ‘fire air’ ” (2011, p. 419).
All three chemists disagreed with one another over various theoretical issues,
but they shared many of the same procedures for producing oxygen gas.
And if the reference of Lavoisier’s ‘oxygen’ was fixed by such procedures,
then in light of these shared procedures, Priestley’s ‘dephlogisticated air’
and Scheele’s ‘fire air’ referred to oxygen as well.
Incidentally, this conclusion provides some support for a couple of claims
I made in previous sections. First of all, in section 2.2, I indicated my
preference for Kitcher’s view over McLeish’s when it comes to the reference
of Priestley’s ‘dephlogisticated air.’ If the reference of Lavoisier’s ‘oxygen’
was fixed by means of experimental operations that he shared with Priestley,
then surely Priestley’s ‘dephlogisticated air’ referred to oxygen by virtue of
those very same operations. Secondly, in section 3.1, I indicated my view
that both Kirwan’s ‘inflammable air’ and Lavoisier’s ‘hydrogene’ referred to
hydrogen. The same story that Chang tells about Lavoisier’s ‘oxygen’ applies
equally well to Lavoisier’s ‘hydrogene.’ And if Lavoisier’s ‘hydrogene’ referred
to hydrogen in light of various experimental operations that he shared with
Kirwan, then surely Kirwan’s ‘inflammable air’ also referred to hydrogen.
While Chang doesn’t present his notion of operational meaning as a way
to avoid Whiggish reference assignments, I take it that a focus on operations
holds the key for doing so. If operations are the means of fixing the reference
of theoretical terms, and if these operations were shared by past scientists,
then we don’t have to attribute to past scientists any beliefs or abilities that
they lacked in order to conclude that they succeeded in referring. And in
that case, none of the reference assignments that I just discussed is Whiggish.
I’ll now put forward my non-Whiggish alternative to Psillos’s theory of
reference, which I’ll present in a form similar to the form that Psillos uses.
I propose that a theoretical term t refers by means of the operations that
scientists use to identify the putative referent of t. And given that, I’ll
motivate the following two conditions:
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1 A term t refers to an entity x if and only if scientists can use the set of
operations associated with t to identify x.
2 Two terms t′ and t denote the same entity x if and only if (a) there are op-
erations associated with t that are also associated with t′; and (b) scientists
can use those operations to identify x.
According to condition 1, if there is no set of operations for identifying the
putative referent of a theoretical term, then reference fails. This may be the
case if the putative referent is hypothetical, in the sense that scientists aren’t
sure whether it exists, or if the putative referent has been eliminated from
science because scientists have shown that it doesn’t exist. Condition 2 is
meant to show how terms from distinct theories, or even distinct historical
periods, can refer to the same entity.
Condition 2 is really the condition that is supposed to ensure that ref-
erence assignments to past terms are not Whiggish. The basic idea is that
we can avoid Whiggish reference assignments by first examining the opera-
tions that past scientists associated with their theoretical terms, and then
looking at present science to determine what, if anything, these operations
are sufficient for identifying. If they are sufficient for identifying something
in the current ontology of science, then it’s possible to make retrospective
reference assignments, and to specify the referents of past terms in modern
language unavailable to past scientists, without attributing to them beliefs
and abilities that they lacked.
At this point, some clarifications are in order. First of all, Chang (2009a;
2011, p. 419) explicitly takes his motivation from P. W. Bridgman’s opera-
tionalism. And as he notes (2009a, §2.1), one frequent criticism of Bridgman’s
operationalism is that the operations associated with a term do not exhaust
its meaning. Chang’s own response is to agree, and to then show that a focus
on operations is nonetheless very useful for understanding various aspects of
scientific activity. My response is similar—while operations do not exhaust
the meaning of a term, they can often be used to fix its reference.
Secondly, conditions 1 and 2 should be understood somewhat loosely. In
condition 1, the set of operations should be understood as capable of changing
over time. Moreover, if that set suffices for identifying some entity, it may
also be the case that a proper subset of those operations suffices, or even
that two distinct proper subsets each suffice on their own. And condition 2
should be understood as not requiring that past and present operations be,
strictly speaking, identical to one another. I take it that we can speak of
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the sameness of past and present operations, even if, say, today’s laboratory
equipment differs from that used in the past, and even if, say, scientists today
take more precautions than chemists working in the late eighteenth century.
Thirdly, there’s the question of how to determine which operations past
scientists performed. In some cases, reading the texts that they wrote will be
sufficient to answer this question. In other cases, we may have to do more.
One method that is available to historians and philosophers of science is to
attempt to perform such operations ourselves.4 Success in the laboratory
may be good evidence that we’ve successfully determined which operations
past scientists performed.
Fourthly, I’ve framed both conditions in terms of whether scientists can
use the operations in question. It may be the case that today, scientists
no longer perform certain operations because they’ve come up with better
ones—ones that are easier to perform, less dangerous, etc. That said, they
may still admit that, strictly speaking, performing those past operations
would be a way of identifying some entity. This is the sense of ‘can’ that I
aim to capture in both conditions.
Fifthly, both conditions make use of the idea that operations can be used
to identify an entity x. The basic idea here is that scientists often know that
some entity x has a number of properties that other entities lack, and they
know how to use various operations to determine whether the entity in ques-
tion has those properties. Hence, the notion of identification to which I’m
appealing involves both theoretical and experimental knowledge. To take an
example, suppose chemists isolate some gas in the course of attempting to
determine the components of some substance. There are subsequent oper-
ations that such chemists could perform, e.g., determining whether the gas
supports respiration and combustion, measuring its mass, and so on. After
performing some such operations, they may be able to conclude that the gas
is oxygen, on the grounds that only a sample of oxygen would have those
properties. In that case, they’ve identified it. Otherwise, while they may
have isolated a sample of oxygen, they haven’t identified it as such.
Sixthly, both conditions make use of present science. The candidates for
the referent of a particular theoretical term come from the ontology of cur-
rent science. And in order to determine which operations are sufficient for
identifying some entity, we need to look at current scientific practice, and at
4Some examples of historians and philosophers who have relied on this methodology are
Jed Buchwald (2008), Hasok Chang (2012, pp. 115–121), and Lawrence Principe (2013).
21
what present-day scientists would say about whether past operations were
sufficient for identification. The two conditions are therefore just as falli-
ble regarding the reference of theoretical terms as present science is fallible
regarding all that falls within its domain.
Seventhly, and finally, it’s worth commenting about some problem cases.
It may be the case that the set of operations associated with some theo-
retical term from past science contains operations sufficient for identifying
some entity x, and operations sufficient for identifying y, where x and y are
distinct. I take it that in such cases, some account of partial reference is
desirable—perhaps one term partially denotes two or more entities, in either
McLeish’s (2006) or Hartry Field’s (1973) sense. I take it that another kind
of problem case is far more common, namely, the case in which some opera-
tions associated with a term from past science can be used to identify some
entity x, while others play no role in identifying x. What should we conclude
in such cases? My proposal is to privilege the operations that can be used
to identify an entity. These operations secure the reference of a theoretical
term to that entity. And the operations that turn out not to play a role in
identifying the entity represent aspects of scientific activity about which past
scientists were mistaken. Since developing a set of operations sufficient for
identifying a theoretical entity is no easy attainment, reference will not be
too easy. And since reference does not require being right about all of the
operations, reference is not too hard.
Now that I’ve clarified my proposal for a non-Whiggish semantic the-
ory, I’ll argue that, when it comes to the example of phlogiston, condition 2
yields the non-Whiggish reference assignment and avoids the Whiggish one.
I’ll start with the non-Whiggish reference assignment, according to which
‘phlogiston’ sometimes referred to hydrogen. As I discussed in section 3.1,
a number of phlogiston theorists identified phlogiston with inflammable air,
which oxygen theorists like Lavoisier identified with his hydrogene. In that
case, the operations that such phlogiston theorists associated with ‘phlogis-
ton’ included those operations that they associated with ‘inflammable air,’
and those operations that the oxygen theorists like Lavoisier associated with
‘hydrogene.’ Moreover, these operations survive to the present day—chemists
associate them with ‘hydrogen,’ and they can use them to identify hydrogen.
Hence, ‘phlogiston’ sometimes referred to hydrogen.
Condition 2 also avoids the Whiggish reference assignment, according to
which ‘phlogiston’ sometimes referred to free electrons. As I discussed in
section 3.2, the operations that some phlogiston theorists associated with
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‘phlogiston’ included those operations by which they identified electricity.5
But even if electricity is ultimately made up of electrons, those operations
did not amount to operations by which they identified free electrons. The
operations that scientists associate with ‘free electrons,’ by means of which
they identify free electrons, did not exist until the late nineteenth century
at the earliest. Hence, even though we can admit that various phlogistonist
explanations of phenomena bear a striking resemblance to the explanations
that we currently accept, we cannot conclude that ‘phlogiston’ and ‘free
electrons’ co-refer to the same entity.
6 Conclusion
In order to understand past science, we must know, at least to some extent,
what past scientists were talking about. In this paper, I’ve proposed one
way of determining what they were talking about, which focuses on scientific
practices, and in particular, on the operations that past and present scientists
perform. I’ve argued that this way of determining what past scientists were
talking about is non-Whiggish, in the sense that it doesn’t involve attributing
to them any beliefs and abilities that they lacked.
I’m hopeful that the semantic theory I’ve proposed here can be developed
and applied in ways that I haven’t discussed in this paper. I take it that it
would be desirable to have a theory that says more about those cases in which
we conclude that the only non-Whiggish reference assignment is reference
failure. If this is all we are told about such cases, I’m not sure that this
conduces to our understanding of past science. In this regard, the theory
ought to be developed further. Moreover, I’m hopeful that it can be applied
to another topic in the philosophy of science that involves the semantics of
theoretical terms, namely, the scientific realism debate.
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